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JOHN A. TATOM
HE nation’s GNP growth in 1982 was so weak
relative to the pace of monetary expansion that the
velocity of money — the ratio of GNF to Ml — fell
significantly. This decline contrasts sharply with the
steadily rising trend in velocity over the past 35 years.
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) refers to
1982 velocity behavior as “historically atypical” and
“not fullyunderstood.” In explaining thelargevelocity
“shift,” the CEA attributes a major role to changes in
asset demands of individuals and businesses, arising
from new financial opportunities or changes in asset
preferences. The CEA phrases the importance of un-
usual shifts in velocity growth succinctly:
The presumption, on the basis ofpast experience, is
that most velocity changes are temporary. Thus, in-
creasing the rate of monetary growth in response to
temporary declines invelocity runsthe risk ofproviding
excessive liquidity and increasinginflation, while afail-
ure to recognize a continuing shift in liquidity prefer-
ence or velocity runs the risk of ~~roviding inadequate
liquidity and reducing real CNP.
Had velocity growth not shifted last year, nominal
GNP growth would have been substantially higher,
and the recession presumably would have notbeen as
lengthy or as severe.
Some observers, interpreting this development as
the breakdown of monetarist theory, have suggested
that “If velocity has become impossible to predict, it
could be 20 years before monetarism becomes the
linchpin of policy again.”2 Before concluding that the
5
Economie Report of the President (Government Printing Office,
1983), pp. 21-22.
2
See “The Failure ofMonetarism,” Business Week, April 4, 1983,
pp. 64—67. In the same article, llobert J. Gordon remarks that
“monetarism has been decimated by the collapse of velocity in
1982.”
link between monetary growth andspending has been
broken or addressing the implications of such a break-
down for monetary policy, it is useful to place last
year’s velocity developments in historical perspective
and to examine the extent of any deviation in the
historical relationshipbetween velocity andthe factors
that influence it.
THE RECENT BEHAVIOR OF
VELOCITY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
On an annual basis, the velocity ofMl grewsteadily
from 1959 to 1981, averaging a 3.2 percent rate of
increase. In 1982, Ml velocityfellat a2.3 percent rate.
Since the standard deviation for velocity growth from
1959—81 was only 1.20 percent, the recent decline, as
the CEA has indicated, appears substantial. Indeed,
any decline would appear unusual based on the record
of systematic increases in velocity since 1959.
Dechnes in velocity are not unprecedented, how-
ever. For example, on an annual basis, Ml velocityfell
at a 1.5 percent rate from 1953 to 1954.°Moreover,
there have been years in the postwar period when
velocity growth was virtually nil, such as 1952 (0.2
percent) and 1958 (0.1 percent).4
3
The current measure of Ml begins in 1959. The old measure used
before 1980 isused here for the period 1947 to 1959. In 1959, the
two measures were nearly identical so that an historical series is
obtained by splicing the two series.
4
L. U. Klein and R. F. Kosobud, “Some Econometrics of Growth:
GreatRatios in Economics,” The Quarterly Journal ofEconomies
(May 1961), pp. 173—98, argue that, adjusted for its trend rate of
growth, velocity is one ofthe “great” ratios that mighthe viewed as
a fundamental parameter for economic theory. They reach this
conclusion, notwithstanding their evidence indicating periodic
sharp velocity declines relative to trend,
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Velocity (GNP/M~)
The Quarterly Record
Additional insight into the 1982 velocity decline can
be obtained using quarterly data. Velocity fell at an
11.2 percent annual rate in the first quarter of 1982,
rose at a 3.3 percent ratein the second quarter, fell at a
3.4 percent rate in the third quarter, then fell at a 9.9
percent rate in the lastquarter of1982. Chart 1 shows
quarterly levels ofvelocity since 1947; pcriods ofreces-
sion are shaded. Note that there are numerous quar-
ters inwhich velocityfell, especiallyduring recessions.
From the first quarter of 1947 to the third quarter of
1981, velocity declined in 32 of the 138 quarters, or
about one-fourth ofthe time. Moreover, velocity typi-
cally fell in periods ofeconomic decline. There are 25
quarters that span thepeak-to-trough periods; velocity
declined in 64 percent ofthem. Nonetheless, the mag-
nitude of the velocity declines in the first arid fourth
quarters of 1982 far exceed the largest one-quarter
decreases in velocity of about 6 percent observed in
1/1948, 11/1948, IV/1953 and 1/1958. One would have
Table 1 shows velocity’s growth rate from peak to
trough in eight postwar recessions. While a decline in
velocity in such periods is not unusual, the size of the
peak-to-trough decline in the recent recession is the
largest recorded. The velocity decline was fairly small
in the four previous recessions. Indeed, in the 1970
recession, velocity was flat, and in the 1973—75 reces-
sion it rose. Yet, except for the 1973—75 recession,
when the unemployment rate rose 3,5 percentage
points from peak to trough, the four previous reces-
sions were notas severe as the recent experience when
unemployment rose 3.3 percentage points from peak
to trough.°The recent experience compares more
aThedata in table 1 suggest that velocity movements in the 1973—75
recession, when velocity actually increased, were more anomalous
than recent velocity movements, The 1973—75 change isconsistent
with a one-time downshift in the demand for money occurring
during that recession. See U. W. Hafer and Scott E. Hem, “The
Shift in Money Demand: What Really Happened?” this Review
(February 1982), pp. 11—16.
1947 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 63 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 it 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 3983
to lookback to 1945 or earlier recessions to find more
rapid decreases in velocity.
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closely to that in the first three postwar recessions,
when the unemployment rate rose about 3.2 percent-
age points from peak to trough.6
EXPLANATIONS OF RECENT
VELOCITY MOVEMENTS
The recent behaviorofvelocity is broadly consistent
with the velocity declines that occurred in most pre-
vious recessions. Nonetheless, analysts have advanced
a variety ofhypotheses to account for the 1982 velocity
experience. Two of these explanations are convention-
al: they are that (1) declining inflation, or (2) declining
interest rates, havereduced the cost ofholding money
and, consequently, the demand for money relative to
goods and services has increased.7
A second group of hypotheses includes those that
usually are not incorporated in conventional analyses.
Principal among these is that recent financial innova-
tions havelowered the cost ofholding money, thereby
increasing its demand and reducingvelocity. Another
hypothesis iii this vein is that international asset pref-
erences have changed so that foreigners’ demand for
the U.S. money stock is greater. According to this
“Declining velocity in recessions is not a postwar phenomenon.
Using Robert Gordon’s estimates of quarterly GNP and Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz’ data on NIl, a measure of Ml
velocity can he constructed since mid—1914. In the seven reces-
sions from 1919—45, velocity fell in all and, with one exception, ata
fasterpace than in the 1981—82 recession. The periods are (growth
rates in parentheses): 111/1918—1/1919 (—28.8 percent), 1/1920—-
111/1921 (—6.6 percent), 11/1923—111/1924 (—6.7 percent), III!
1926—IV/1927 (—2.2 percent), 11/1929—1/1933 (—12.8 percent),
11/1937—11/1938 (—5.8 percent), and 1/1945—IV/1945 (—22.5 per-
cent). See Robert J. Gordon, “Price Inertiaand Policy Ineffective-
ness in the United States, 1890—1980,” Journalof Political Econ-
omy (December 1982), pp. 1087—117; and Milton Friedman and
Anna Jacobson Schwartz, AMonetanj I-listortj ofthe United States,
1867—1960 (Princeton University Press. 1963).
T
See Bluford H. Putnam, “This Money Bulge Isn’t Inflationary,”
Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1983, for a discussion of these
explanations and others. Also, see John P. Judd, “The Recent
Decline in \‘elocity: Instability in Money Demand or Inflation?”
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review (Spring
1983, forthcoming). Judd claims that declining interest rates ex-
plain the pattern ofmoney growth since the end of1981 and that
the demand for money contained in the San Francisco money
market model was stable. Velocity fell because ofthis predictable
strength inmoneydemand. Judd (Toes not argue that the sensitivity
of money demand to changes in imsterest rates and inflation has
changed. An example of the latter argument is contained in Flint
I3rayton, Terry Farr and Richard Porter, “Alternative Money
Demand Specifications and Recent Growth in NI 1” (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. May 23, 1983; pro-
cessed).
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view, the international strength ofthe dollar accounts
for the decline in velocity.8 Allfour explanations suffer
from a lack of historical perspective that blunts their
intuitive appeal.
Declining Inflation
Inflation has declined steadily since the first quarter
of 1981, but velocity declines did not become a source
ofconcern until ayear later. As measured by the rateof
increase in the CNP deflator, inflation peaked at 10.4
percent in the year ending in the first quarter of1981.
This rate declined to 7. 1 percent over the following
year, then to 4.7 percent in the year ending in the first
quarter of 1983. The decline in velocity is concentrated
heavily in only two quarters of 1982, long after the
decline in inflationbegan. Moreover, in the first three
quarters of 1981, when the inflation wasslowingsharp-
ly, velocity rose at a 7.1 percent rate. Ofcourse, it is
conceivable that changes in expected inflation lagged
far behind actual inflation developments, but lacking
evidence of such a delayed and discontinuous adjust-
ment process, such a notion can he disregarded.
5
Putnamn, “This Money Bulge.” providesthis explanation alongwith
the declining inflation and financial innovation explanation. Also.
see Vincent Salvo, “Is U.S. Money Growth A Foreign A~ir?”
International Finance, (Chase Manhattan Bank. April 25, 1983),
pp. 1, 7, &
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Declining interest Rate,s
Explanations that focus on declining interest rates
also do not match up well with the recent pattern of
velocity declines. In thefirst quarter of 1982, corporate
Aaa bond yields averaged 15.01 percent and had risen
from 14,62 percent one quarter earlier or 14.92 per-
cent two quarters earlier. During the remaining quar-
ters of1982, the bond yield declined to 14.51 percent,
13.75 percent and 11.88 percent.9 The pattern in the
second half of 1982 is consistent with a decline in
velocity. What remains unexplained, however, is the
largest decline in velocity, which occurred in the first
quarter.
Financiai Innovations
Financial innovations are a widely discussed ex-
planation ofvelocity shifts. Thisargument is by far the
most puzzling, because there were no major innova-
tions over the period in which velocity behavior ap-
peared aberrant to most observers. Analysts generally
refer to the introduction of super-NOW accounts or
money marketdeposit accountsin connection withthis
hypothesis. Unfortunately, the former were not
allowed until January 1983 and the latter were autho-
rized in mid-December 1982, three weeks before the
end of the period of declining velocity discussed
above. 10
Foreign Demand for the Dollar
The international currency preferences explanation
also does not match the recent velocity pattern. The
°Theuse ofshort-term rates does not alter the disparate pattern. 1mm
the first quarter of 1982, 3-month Treasury bill yields averaged
12.81 percent, higher than the 11.75 percent yield a quarter ear-
lier, although somewhatbelow the15.05 percent average yield two
quartersearlier. This ratealso declined over the suhsequent three
quarters.
iO’~~he only example ofa major financial innovation in recent years
that fits the hypothesis is the introduction ofnationwide NOW
accountsin January 1981. There was a sharp surge in the share of
total checkabledeposits heldasNOW balances orother checkable
deposits from January to April. Earlier analyses have failed to
revealany nnnsnalvelocitydevelopments in 1981 dueto this shift.
See John A. Tatom, “Recent Financial Innovations: Have They
Distorted the Meaning of Ml?” this Review (April 1982), pp.
23—35; Scott E. Hem, “Short’Run Money Growth Volatility; Evi-
dence of Misbehaving Money Demand?” this Review (June/July
1982), pp. 27—36; Bryon Higgins and John Faust, “NOWs and
Super-NOWs:Implications for Defining and Measuring Money,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (January
1983), pp. 3—18. On theabsence ofeffects from the late 1982 and
early 1983 innovations, see John A. Tatomn, “Money Market De-
posit Accounts, Super-NOWs and Monetary Policy,” this Review
(March 1983), pp. 5—16.
effective exchange rate has been rising steadily since
the third quarter of 1980, except for a decline in the
fourth quarter of 1981. The rates of increase in the
exchange value ofthe dollar from 111/1980 to 111/1981
and from IV/1981 to IV/1982 are 28.8 percent and 16
percent, respectively. In the firstperiod, velocity rose
5.6 percent despite the strong appreciation ofthe dol-
lar. Only in the latter period, when the rate ofappre-
ciation slowed, did velocity growth slow.
An earlier example further illustrates the difficulty
with this explanation. In the second quarter of 1981,
just before the recent recession, the exchange value of
the dollarwas virtuallythe same as in the third quarter
of 1977. Over the four-year period, the exchange rate
first fell rapidly (12 percent rate from 111/1977 to
F%’/1978), then declined more slowly (1.6percent rate
from IV/1978 to 111/1980), and finally surged upward
(28.5percent rate from 111/1980 to 11/1981). Over the
same periods, velocity grew at 4.5, 1.6, and 5.6 per-
cent rates, respectively. Thus, velocity growth was
strongest during the period of rapid appreciation.
Moreover, itwas only slightly slower—and well above
trend growth — during the period of rapid decline in
the value of the dollar.
The conceptual difficulty with this explanation is
that the movements in the exchangevalue ofthe dollar
reflect inflation and monetary growth developments.
At least forthe United States, the majorproviderofthe
world money supply, these factors are included in
conventional analysesofGNP growth andvelocity. It is
riot likely that the exchange rate could exert a major
impact of its own.”
WHY DOES VELOCITY FALL IN
RECESSIONS?
Declining Real Income
The principal reason that velocity declines in are-
cession is because of a temporary decline in real in-
come. Velocity can be viewed as real income (x) per
‘
tm
The enrreney preferences argument also appears to confuse
money and other financial assets. While the foreign demand for
U.S. financial assetshas risendramatically, especially in 1980 and
1981, foreign ownership of money has not. Estimates based on
individnal, partnership andcorporate deposits showessentiallyno
change in the less than2.5 percent ofgross demand deposits due
to foreign holders for December data from 1978 through 1982.
Similarly, bank demand liabilities to foreigners, including all for-
eign banks orexcluding foreign financial institutions, have shown
no tendency to increase since 1979. Federal Reserve Bulletin (May
1983), p. A25 and p. A59.
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unitofreal money balances (m). An income elasticityof
demand for money less than one will yield procyclical
velocity; for example, a 1 percent decline in real in-
comewill induce asmaller reduction inthe demand for
realmoney balances. As a result, velocity, x/m, will fall
during a recession, other things held constant.’2
Lagged Adjustment of G~’Pto
Monetary Growth
Velocity also typically falls in recessions due to the
linkbetween nominal GNP growthand moneygrowth.
The growth rate of nominal GNP is determined pri-
marily by the growth rate of the money supply. There
are lags, however, in the response of nominal GNP to
changes in moneygrowth. When money growth slows,
GNP growth initially slows by less; thus, velocity
growth rises. Within a few quarters, however, the
effect of the slowing in money growth is reflected in
further reductions in GNP growth so that, while GNP
growth continues to slow and money growth does not,
velocity growth falls.
Furthermore, the monetary theory of the business
cycle indicates that, after some time (about two quar-
ters), a substantial decline in the money growth will
cause a recession. The periods of falling velocity
growth associated with a slowing in money growth
coincide with the period of recession induced by a
slowing in money.’3
The pattern ofmoney growth overthe last two years
bears out this type of movement. Table 2 shows the
‘
tm
Milton Friedman, “The Quantity Theory ofMoney—A Restate-
ment,” in Milton Friedman, ed. Studies in the Quantity Theory
ofMoney(University ofChicago Press, 1956), pp. 18—19, explains
that the demand ftr money, in principle, depends on “expected
income” or “permanent income.” In recessions, measured income
or GNP declines relative to permanent income, As a result,
moneyholdings riserelative to measured income orGNP, hut not
relative to permanent income. Such a movement in moneyhold-
ingsrelative to spending alsois expected based on a “precaution-
ary motive” for holding money. As “The Failure ofMonetarism”
notes, “In a weak economy, fear oflosing one’s job is a strong
incentive for keeping a larger amount of money in a checking
account in order to get at it quickly” (p. 64).
‘
3
The theory that velocitydeclines relative totrend duringa reces-
sionbecause ofthe same slowing inmoney growth that causes the
recession was developed and subjected to one ofits first tests by
Clark Warburton, “The Theory of Tunsing Points in Business
Fluctuations,” QuarterlyJournalof Economics (November1950),
pp. 529—49. See also Milton Friedman, “A Theoretical
Framework for Monetary Analysis,” in Robert J. Gordon, ed.,
Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework (University ofChicago
Press, 1974), pp. 1—62. Friedman provides a theory ofnominal
income in whichvelocityis procyelicaldue todeviations ofmone-
tan’ growth from the expected growth of nominal income (see
especially pp. 38—48). He also indicates that this result is rein-
forced hy deviations in money supply growth from growth in the
demand for money (pp. 51—53).
growth rates of Ml and velocity for the period from
111/1980 to IV/1982. During quarters in which money
growth accelerated, such as 111/1980, 11/1981, 1/1982
and IV/1982, velocity growth wasnegative. Moreover,
these periods followed unusually slow money growth,
such as in the second half of 1981 and in 11/1982.
In periods when velocity growth slowed, including
111/1980, 11/1981, IV/1981, 1/1982, 111/1982 and
IV/1982, the slowing was due inpart to the contempo-
raneous acceleration in money growth and in part to
the adverse reactions of GNP growth to past slowings
in money growth.
The Course of inventory Adjustment
When salesgrowth slows inthe latestageofacyclical
expansion or the early stage ofa recession, firms may
either fail toanticipate the decline, anticipate that the
decline is more temporary than is the case, or simply
choose to adjust production growth more slowly. In
each event, firms would fail to reduce production as
much as sales fell, thus accumulating undesired inven-
tories. Since inventory investment, whether desired
or not, is included in spending on final goods and
services, GNP can be temporarily strong compared
with desired spending, or GNP velocity can be raised
relative tofinal sales (GNF less inventory investment)
velocity.
Similarly, when sales expand in the late stages of a
recession or early stages of recovery, firms may not
anticipate the expansion, anticipate that it is only tem-
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Ch,,t 2
Growth Rates of GNP Velocity and Final Sales Velocity”
porary, or simply engage in production smoothing;
thus, they initially will meet the sales increase out of
inventory rather than stepped-up production. In this
case, CNP will not keep pace with final sales, so that
velocity measured relative to GNP will fall compared
with velocity measured relative to final sales.
Chart 2 shows the growthrates of CNP velocity and
final salesvelocity since 1948. Two-quarterperiods are
used to smooth the data somewhat. The average
growth rates of the two series from 1/1948 to 11/1983
are nearly identical (3.17 percent for CNP and 3.18
percent for final sales). The two measures of velocity
growth are fairly similar except around the end of
the shaded recession periods and the beginning of
the recoveries. At these times, much wider swings
occurred in CNP velocity due to inventory ad-
justments. ~
14
For a discussion of the importance of inventory movements be-
fore, during and after recessions, see John A. Tatom, “Inventory
Investment in the Recent Recessionand Recovery,” this Review
(April 1977), pp. 2—9. Also, Frank DeLeeuw, “Inventory Invest-
Table 3
Recent Developments in Real Inventory
Investment, Output and Sales
Real Real
inventory Real GNP final sales
Quarter investment growth rate growth rate
1981,IV $ 6.0 4.9% - 2 3%
19821 102 55 -1.3
H -34 09 --0.9
Ill 13 10 15
IV 22.7 13 45
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Therecent divergence in thetwo measures ofveloc-
ity growth is large, because of the sharp swings in
inventory investment in thefirst andfourth quarters of
1982. Table 3 shows real inventory investment from
the preceding peakto the end of1982, as well as real
final sales and real GNP growth. The pace ofinventory
reductions inboth the first and fourth quarters of 1982
(— $10.2 billion and —$22.7 billion (1972 prices), re-
spectively) are among the largest on record, with the
latter exceeding the previous record of —$14.3 billion
in early 1975. In both of these quarters, realfinal sales
growth accelerated. Each ofthese sales accelerations
wasassociated withasharpacceleration to double-digit
moneygrowth (see table 2). In eachcase, the improve-
ment in real sales was met out ofinventory, indicating
either that producers failed to anticipate the improve-
ment, or that they were willing to treat it as an oppor~
tunity to eliminateundesired inventory, allowing pro-
duction growth to rise more smoothly.
As noted above, GNP growth is more volatile than
that ofreal final sales due to relatively large swings in
inventory investment. On average, these swings
should cancel out so that CNP growth matches final
sales growth. One way to assess the contribution of
inventory swingsto GNF growth isto decompose GNP
into the product of two components: S and (1 + I/S),
where S is final sales and Ii sthe change in business
inventories. The growth rate of nominal production
(400 Mn GNP) can be broken down into a component
that arisesfrom the growth of sales and a second com-
ponent, the production growth which meets changes
in the ratio of inventory investment to final sales [400
Mn (1 + I/S)]. Chart 3 shows this second component
along with total GNP growth from 1947 to the second
quarter of 1983.
On average, the growth rate ofproduction matches
that offinal sales; the contribution ofinventory swings
[400 zXln(l + 1/S)] is essentially zero (—0.01 percent),
though it ranges widely from about —8.8 percent to
13.5 percent in some quarters. The most pronounced
effects are in recessions, when large negative effects
are registered, and in the initial stages of recovery,
when some of the large positive contributions of the
end ofinventory depletions are evident. Not surpris-
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first and fourth quarters of 1982 are among the largest
negative effects shown in chart 3.
WAS VELOCITY GROWTH IN 1982
REALLY AN ABERRATION?
Weak or negative velocity growth is common during
recessions becauseof(1) the influence ofthe transitory
reduction in GNP with its smaller attendant reduction
in the demand for money, (2) the pattern of money
growth that usually gives rise to the recession, and (3)
inventory adjustments that typically depress produc-
tion relative to sales before or duringthe initial stage of
a recovery.
To assess the cyclical nature of velocity, one must
account for the strong trend in its growth rate, as well
as several transitory or, perhaps, permanent effects
arising from monetary and fiscal policy changes and
other shocks. The direct cyclicalcomponent ofvelocity
is captured by relating the level ofvelocity to the GNP
gap, the percentage by which the nation’s potential
output exceeds its actual real GNP.’5 An increase in
the GNP gap reflects a decline in real income relative
to potential output. Its effect on velocity indicates the
operation of the income elasticity of money demand
and captures, in part, the transitory effect ofcyclical
inventory movements on observed CNP.
It is well-known that current GNP growth depends
on past as well as current monetary policy actions.
Because the demand for goods and services responds
with a lag, current CNF or velocity measures are sub-
ject to temponry movements arising from changes in
money growth. Fiscalpolicy also can influence GNP; a
fiscal measure, specifically the growth rate of high-
employment federal expenditures, is included in the
velocity equations below. 16
‘
5
The GNP gap (C) is measured here by the difference in the
logarithm of each series. This Bank’s potential output series is
used to measure thegap. It isexplained inJohnA. Tatom, “Poten-
tial Output and the Recent Productivity Decline,” this Review
(January 1982), pp. 3—16. Changes in the GNP gap are highly
correlated with other cyclical measures such as changes in mea-
suresofthecapacity utilization rate orunemployment rate, so that
theycan oftenbe used interchangeably. For example, the simple
correlation coefficient between quarterly changes in the unem-
ployment rate and theCNP gap is0.70 over the period 11111948—
11111981.
tt
The inclusion of lagged effects of monetary and fiscal policy is
based on the Andersen-Jordan equation for CNP growth. See
Keith M. Carlson, “A Monetary Analysis of theAdministration’s
Budget and Economic Projections,” this Review (May 1982), p.
14; and John A. Tatom, “Energy Prices and Short-Run Economic
Performance,” this Review (January 1981), pp. 3—17. The latter
suggests the inclusion of some other factors that are discussed
below. Laggedadjustment to money supplychanges hasalsobeen
There are otherfactors that influence velocity, espe-
cially the opportunity costofholding money instead of
other assets. An increase in the cost ofholding money
reduces the demand for it and raises velocity, other
things being equal. A major component of the cost of
holdingtransaction balances is the rateofdepreciation
of the value ofmoney, or the general rate ofincrease of
prices. In addition, other assets can be held instead of
money so that the real rate of return on alternative
investments influences the decision to hold money.
Given the expected inflation rate, movements innom-
inal interest rates reflect movements in real rates of
return.
Velocity, then, ishypothesized to be afunction of(1)
current and past levels of the money stock (M) and
high-employment expenditures (E); (2) inflation ex-
pectations, which, ifexpectations are unbiased, can be
measured by changes inthe rateofincrease ofthe GNP
deflator (P); (3) the rate of interest, in this instance,
measured by the Aaa bond yield (r); and (4) slack,
measured by the GNP gap. Two other factors that
affect CNP at least temporarily — strikes that tempo-
rarily affect production and spending (5), measured by
days lost due to strikesrelative to the sizeofthe civilian
labor force, and movements in the relative price of
energy (p°), measured by the producer price of fuel
and related products and power deflated by the busi-
ness sector implicit price deflator — are included.
Estimating Velocity Growth
To find the historical relationship ofvelocity growth
to these factors, differences in logarithms are used to
measure growth rates, in which case the variable is
expressed with a dot above it.’7 An estimate for veloc-
emphasized recently by Jack Carr and Michael R. Darhy, “The
Role of Money Supply Shocks in the Short-Run Demand for
Money,”Journal of Monetary Economics (September 1981), pp.
183—99. An earlier formulation and test oftins hypothesis maybe
found in Leonall C. Andersen, “Observed Income Velocity of
Money: A Misunderstood Issuein Monetary Policy,” this Review
(August 1975), pp. 8—19. The results here have the same prop-
erties and policy implications as the Andersen-Jordan equation.
1
Arithmeticall~’,velocity growth in aquarter isthe sum ofthe rates
ofincrease ofprices andreal output, less the growth rate ofmoney
during the quarter. Thus, the strong significance ofthese factors
on the right-hand-sideofequation 4 is not surprising. The use of
accelerations in moneyand prices reduces biasesarisingfrom the
arithmetic relationship. The fact that the coefficients on cuntem~
poraneous tnoney, gap and inflation are significantly different
from unity reinforcesthe explanatory power oftheequation. The
simplecorrelation coefficients between ~M, ~G and AP are (AM,
AG) —0.08, (AM,AP) —0.03, and (AG, AP) —0.06. Biases arising
from thearithmetic relationship do not appear to he a substantial
problem for the interpretation or quality of the regression re-
ported in table 4.
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Table 4
A Model of GNP Velocity Growth:
111/1948—111/1981
Q, 3.825 0.801 A11, - 0.555 AM1 0.371 AKI,
(9.49) ( 11.10) I 6.44) ( 380)
0248 AKI, 0188 SM. . 0032 E,
- 2.79j I 222) (2.74)
0.005 E, 0029 E. 2 0004 E, 0.855 .50
0.41) 1 246) 385) 1 15.88)
- 0.015 ~r, - 0443 AP, 0.248 AS, 0.040j~
(116) 16.96) (-413) C- 208
- 0.~20~f- 0.077~f 2
- 1.39) (340)
- 0.80 SE - 1.94 DW -‘ 2.01 ~ = 0.45
It ‘ 581)
itv growth from 111/1948 to 111/1981 is given in table
418 The coefficients on the monetary growth terms
indicatethe cumulative sum oftheeffects ofa rise in M
on velocity growth.’9 Thus, an acceleration in money
growth inperiod t by 1 percent initially reduces veloc-
ity growth in period t by 0.8 percent; subsequently,
velocity growth is depressed by less: 0.6 percent one
quarter later, 0.4 percent two quarters later, then 0.2
percent, 0.2 percent and, five quarters later, notat all.
Ifvelocity had been growing at 3.8 percent, assuming
all otherinfluences remain the same, such a sustained
increase in money growth would yield a series ofveloc-
ity growth rates that fell and then rose: 3.0 percent,
initially, then 3.2 percent, 3.4 percent, 3.5 percent,
‘
t
thng lag searches (up to 20 quarters for money and federal
expenditure growth) wereconducted for a sample period 111955—
111/1981, because data limitations are too great for the period
beginning in 111/1948. The optimal lag structure, chosen by F-
tests ofsequential addition ofindividual lags and groups oflags,
was the same as that used here.
10









+ ... + (~~~)AM,_,
1
+
± ~)K1 ~.1fthe permanent effect ofarise in ~I on ‘~‘ iszero, the
last term vanishes. In the equation in table 4, the absence of a
permanent effect can be tested by addingthe money growthrate
lagged five quarters to the equation. When this is done, its coef-
ficient (— 0.103) is not significantly different from zero
(t = —0.78). Consequently, thispermanent effect isconstrained to
zero in table 4 and for the examination ofthe recent experience.
The coefficients on the AM terms are estimated to lie along a
second-degree polynomial without endpoint constraints. The F-
statisticfor the polynomial restriction is F
2110
2.47, so that the
polynomial restrictions cannot be rejected.
and 3.5 percent, before returning to 3.8 percent five
quarters later. There is no permanent effect ofmoney
growth on velocity growth, only transitory effects that
disappear after five quarters.
The effect of the GNP gap on velocity is highly
significant: each 1 percent increase in the gap reduces
velocity by almost 0.9 percent. An increase in high-
employment federal expenditures initially raises
velocity, then reduces it. Energy price increases in-
itially reduce velocity, then raise it, other factors re-
maining the same.20 An increase in inflation signifi-
cantly andpermanently raisesthe levelofvelocity. The
interest rate is not significant at conventional levels,
but is included since it has the expected sign and a
t-statistic that is greater than one.21 Finally, strikes
temporarily reduce velocity.22
Velocity Growth in the Recent Recession
When velocity growth is simulated for the 1981—82
recession, the equation tracksthe actualdevelopments
quite well(see table 5). Despite thesharp reductions in
velocity in the first and fourth quarters of 1982, un-
usual errors do not result. While undue attention to
every wiggle in velocity growth is clearly to be
avoided, it is worth noting that the record movements
in inventories during these two quarters and their
2
°Thesumofthe federal expenditure effects on velocity is —0.047
and it isnot significantly different fromzero(t 1.68). The sum of
the energy price effects, 0.007, is also insignificant (t = 0.24).
High-employment expenditures and energy prices have no
permanent effect on velocity.
“When a short-term interest rate, the 4- to 6-month commercial
paperrate, is used instead ofthe Aaabond yield, its insignificant
(t=o.78) coefficient is 0.003. Otherwise, the equation estimates
are virtually identical. Allowing the interest elasticity of velocity
to he a positive function ofthe interest rate, by using Ar rather
thanAIn r,resulted in a higher standard error ofestimate for both
long- and short-term rates. For both rates, moreover, the coef-
ficient reverses sign and the t-statistic falls below one-half. The
small t-statistic reported for r in table 4 does not result from
collinearitv with changes in the inflation rate; the correlation
coefficient of these two variables is virtually zero (—0.007).
“The model shown in table4 can also be used successfully for final
sales velocity growth, except that strikes, interest rates, and con-
temporaryenergy price changes do not affect it significantly. The
model hasthe same properties; moneygrowth, high-employment
expenditure growth, andchangesin therelative priceofenergy do
not have significantpermanent impactson finalsales velocity. The
adjusted if ofthe final sales velocity growth rate is 0.46 over the
period used in table 4. This equation is stable across the IV/1973
and 111/1981 breakpoints at a9 5percent confidence level.
The gap coefficient in the final sales equation is much smaller
(—0.44), indicating that thecyclical component ofGNP velocity is
capturing some of the inventory adjustment. A decomposition
shows that money growth accounts for mostofthe sharp negative
swings ofGNP velocity growth, however,




SimulatingSW ~fty erowthin The
RecentReceótt
A~dat — — v_
peuodeM~g ~rewth ~rewth Error
981/W 088 - 045
1902/1 iiJØ 057 2,29
tI 324 079 225
lit ~4$ 0.29 an
IV 1t4$ 83 260
10/ 08t4V 1902 441 3,09’ 132
~0pt-mean~square0 error2.53
1Growlh rates are expressed ~es409 rates the change In the
logarithm ofvelocity
impact on production and velocity are captured sur-
prisinglywell. The mean error for therecessionperiod
(1.32 percent) and the root-mean-squared error (2.53
percent) are not at odds with the quality of the errors
characterizing the prior behavior of velocity growth,
indicated by the equation’s standard error of 1.94
percent. 23
When the equation in table 4 is re-estimated for the
longer period to IV/1982, the F-statistic that is used to
test for a structural change between the earlier period
and the latest five recession quarters is F51g3
= 1.55,
which is not significant at a9 5percent confidence
level. This F-test and the evidence in table 5 indicate
that the historically weak performance of velocity in
the recent recession is not unusual; that is, it has
resulted fromthenormalworking offactors thattend to
depress GNP velocity in recessions, not from a major
breakdown of past relationships.24
The coefficients in the velocity growth equation can
be used to decompose the simulated growth rates into
the direct contribution of each variable during the
“The equation in table 4 can he used to generate simulations for
velocity growth in earlier recessions(see table 1) on a comparable
basis. When this isdone, the direction ofthe velocity movement
in each ofthe seven previous recessions isaccurately simulated;
the mean absoluteerror forthese seven recessions is 1.07 percent.
“The equation in table 4i sstable according to a Chow test. Also,
when the sample period is broken at the fourth quarter of 1973,
the F-statistic is F,
5103
1.45, which is not significant at a5
percent significance level.
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t3ased op table 4 oqeINqentsandaat changes in the (solos
intluerrang velocity. The results ar convertedto compounded
annualrates, oWdoesnot adddueIn rounding
recent recession.25The results for the recent recession
periodappear intable 6. The primaryfactor accounting
for the decline was the normalcyclical response to the
transitory decline in income associatedwith the reces-
sion; this effect, measured by the change in the GNP
gap and indicated in the table as the “cycle” influence,
was —4.9 percent. The second major factor was the
transitory effect arising from variations in money
growth before and during the recession. Since the
primary determinant of the decline in real output or
the size ofthe CNP gapis the pattern ofpast monetary
growth, the lion’s shareofthe recentbehaviorofveloc-
ity is directly or indirectly attributable to the volatile
path of monetary growth.
Other factors played minor roles. In particular, de-
clining inflation and declining interest rates each con-
“The major controversy addressed here is the velocity decline in
therecent recession, especiallyin 1982. In the first quarter of1983,
velocity fell ata 5.75 percent compounded annual rate. The de-
dine, while substantially smaller in size thanthose in thefirst and
fourth quarters of1982, isnoteworthy for its sizein the absence of
a major swing in the contribution of inventory liquidations. In-
deed, while real inventory investment remained negative,
$ — 15.4 billion (1972prices), the contribution ofinventoryinvest-
ment to GNP growth waspositive, +2.3 percentage points, since
thepace ofliquidationslowed. Moreimportant, when thevelocity
model isused to make a one-quarter-ahead forecast from IV/1982,
the predicted velocity growth rate is —0.9 percent. Thus, the
error in 1/1983 is significantly larger (2.5 times larger) than the
standard error of the estimating equation. None of the F-test
results or conclusions about the five-quarter simulation experi-
ment in table 5 are altered ifthe first quarter of the recovery is
included, however.
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tributed 0.5 percentage points or less to the decline.
Nonetheless, these other factors amplified the decline
somewhat. 26
CONCLUSION
The velocity of money fell sharply in the recent
recession, suggesting to some observers at least that
the relationship of the money stock to total spending
hadbroken down. Indeed, manyobservers went on to
posit new hypotheses concerning the reasons for the
velocity decline such as financial innovations, for-
eigners’ attractions to dollarassets, or unusually strong
reactions to the slowing of the U.S. inflation rate or
interest rates. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the tim-
ing and magnitude of these developments do not
match up well with velocity developments in the re-
cent past.
The velocity decline does appear, superficially, to
represent a major break from past experience and,
therefore, to be a source ofconcern for policymakers.
Afterall, in 1982velocity fellat a 2.3 percent rate (year
overyear) after rising at a3.2 percent average rateover
the previous 22 years, suggesting a shortfall of 5.5
percentage points. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the
decline in velocity during the recent recession was
even larger.
It is not unusual, however, forvelocitytodecline ina
recession. It is, in fact, quite typical. Short-termmove-
ments in velocity reflect diverse reactions ofthe econ-
omy to monetary policy actions. In a recession, all of
these reactions generally contribute to a temporary
decline in velocity. Given the length and severity of
the recent recession, where the severity is measured
by the unemployment rate or the gap between the
nation’s potential and actualreal GNP, it is not surpris-
ingthat velocity registered the largest decline in post-
World War II recessions.
20
lnterestingly compared with the previous seven postwar reces-
sions, the cyclical component wasnot unusually largein the recent
recession. The cyclical contribution (compounded annual rate
from cycle peak to trough) in the seven recessions from 1948—49
to 1980 is estimated to he —5.4 percent, —5.2 percent, —5.1
percent, — 2.9 percent, —3.0 percent, —4.7 percent and —5.0
percent, respectively. Four of the previous seven effects exceed
the recent cyclical effect.
A detailed development ofthe standard hypotheses
concerning velocity behavior, including the transitory
influences ofmonetary growth, fiscal policy, and ener-
gy price shocks on observed spending and velocity,
suggests an empirical formulation that accounts well
for velocity behavior in the post-World War II era.
More important, simulations of this historical experi-
ence for the recent recession indicate that there were
no significant breakdowns in the relationship of the
factors accounting for velocity behavior.
In a previous study of velocity movements,
Andersen concluded that“the use ofobserved changes
in velocity growth, by themselves, in conducting
monetary policy is often misleading and potentially
dangerous.”27 This conclusion is perhaps most impor-
tant surrounding recessions and the early stages of
recovery when velocity movements are so strongly
influenced by the temporary effects of past monetary
actions.
Monetarygrowth tends to be most variable around a
period of recession, especially when a sizable decline
initially sets offthe recession itself. Such avariation in
money growth creates temporary movements in velo-
city; not only is the supply ofmoney in flux, but real
output is as well, as the demand for money adjusts to
the money supply variation. Variations in real output
and velocity are further enlarged temporarily by in-
ventory adjustments.
In the recent recession, these processes were mag-
nified by the degree and extentofmonetary stringency
during some periods priortothe recession. As a result,
the normal cyclical movement ofmoney demand was
large, and swings in inventory investment further dis-
torted, temporarily, the movements ofvelocity. Other
factors, including the temporary decline in inflation
and movements in interest rates, federal expenditures
and energy prices all worked in the same direction,
reducing velocity in the recent recession. Thus, the
extent of the declinein velocityin the recent recession
was not unusual, nor did it represent an atypical shift
with important, but unknown, implications for policy-
making.
27
Anderscn, “Observed Income Velocity of Money,” p. 19.
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